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I. INTRODUCTION
The use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) practices has become
commonplace in many large American firms. A growing number of
organizations are turning to various ADR methods designed to deal with
inevitable organizational conflicts and disputes.' Much has been written
about the implications this dramatic change has had for employers,
managers, and their employees.2 Nevertheless, despite ADR's prevalence
and the extensive research documenting its organizational manifestations,
many empirical questions remain regarding the factors and pressures that
have brought about this substantial transformation in the way organizations
manage and address workplace conflict. ADR scholars have developed a
number of theoretical frameworks in an attempt to better explain the
widespread diffusion of ADR in the United States and in other developed
countries.3
At the heart of this research is an attempt to isolate central predictors of
organizational use of different dispute resolution approaches. Why do some
organizations use ADR practices, while others choose to rely on traditional
I DAVID B. LIPSKY ET AL., EMERGING SYSTEMS FOR MANAGING WORKPLACE
CONFLICT: LESSONS FROM AMERICAN CORPORATIONS FOR MANAGERS AND DISPUTE
RESOLUTION PROFESSIONALS 75-115 (2003) (Chapter 3 documents the rise of ADR in the
United States); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST
PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1995) (The GAO
surveyed 2000 businesses about their use of ADR in resolving discrimination complaints.
It found that 90% of the companies surveyed used one or more ADR methods for
resolving such complaints but few used arbitration); David W. Harwell & Michael E.
Weinzierl, Alternatives to Business Lawsuits, 41 BUs. AND ECON. REV. 40 (1995)
(Discusses the survey of businesses conducted by DeLoitte and Touche in 1993, which
also found the growing use of ADR practices by employers); U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN
THE WORKPLACE (1997) (Another study by the GAO, focusing on employers' use of
ADR to resolve workplace disputes).
2 See, e.g., Ariel C. Avgar, Treating Conflict: Conflict and Its Resolution in Health
Care (2008) (unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Cornell University); LIPSKY ET AL., supra
note 1, at 117-52 (discussing how many U.S. employers have moved from using ADR
techniques to establishment of conflict management systems); Alexander James Colvin,
Citizens and Citadels: Dispute Resolution and the Governance of Employment Relations
(1999) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University).
3 See, e.g., LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 117-19; Alexander J.S. Colvin,
Institutional Pressures, Human Resource Strategies, and the Rise of Non-Union Dispute
Resolution Procedures, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375, 389-91 (2003); David B.
Lipsky & Ariel C. Avgar, Toward a Strategic Theory of Workplace Conflict
Management, 24 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 143, 189 (2008).
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litigation or managerial authority to resolve workplace disputes? This study
contributes to the effort to understand the adoption of workplace ADR by
examining the relationship between the union status of the employer and a
number of measures of ADR adoption and practice in large U.S.
corporations. Since the 1970s, large employers in the U.S. have pioneered the
use of ADR to resolve workplace disputes, and it is obviously of central
interest to understand what role the union status of the firm may have played
in promoting or deterring the widespread adoption of ADR.4
In fact, we have not been able to discover any data-driven, empirical
research on the relationship between unions and ADR. Everything we know
about this topic, it seems, is based principally on supposition, anecdotes,
interviews, and case studies.5 In this paper we use data from a sample of 368
corporations obtained in a 2011 survey of Fortune 1000 corporations to
analyze the relationship between unions and workplace ADR in large U.S.
companies. We examine an array of factors that distinguish union from
nonunion corporations in their use of workplace ADR.
In the next section of this paper we attempt to clarify the influence that
unionization may have on employer decisions to adopt and use ADR by
reviewing the literature on this topic. Two perspectives on understanding the
union role emerge from the literature. The first is the union avoidance or
union substitution perspective, which holds that employers use ADR as a
means of avoiding the unionization of their facilities or as a substitute for
collective bargaining in resolving workplace disputes. The second is the
union complementarity perspective, which holds that employers view ADR
as a complement to collective bargaining, i.e., as a means of adapting some
of the techniques used in collective bargaining (negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, etc.) for the employer's nonunion employees. Both of these
perspectives can be viewed as alternative strategies employers may use in
managing workplace conflict. By viewing the use of ADR practices as a
function of an employer's strategic choice, we underscore the importance of
4 A number of scholars have examined the relationship unions and ADR, albeit
without the use of empirical data. See, e.g., David Lewin, Unionism and Employment
Conflict Resolution: Rethinking Collective Voice and Its Consequences, 26 J. OF LAB.
RES. 209, 209-39 (2005); Peter Feuille & Denise R. Chachere, Looking Fair or Being
Fair: Remedial Voice Procedures in Nonunion Workplaces, 21 J. OF MGMT. 27, 27-29
(1995). For a study that does use empirical data, see Colvin, supra note 3.
5 See LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 303-04 (using data from a 1997 survey of
Fortune 1000 corporations but bases its analysis on the relationship between unions and
ADR on case studies); Avgar, supra note 2 (basing its analysis of the role of unions in a
conflict management system on a case study of a large hospital in Ohio and uses survey
data from a sample of employees at the hospital).
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an employer's goals and objectives in deciding how to view the question of
unionism and which specific ADR practices to implement to achieve those
objectives.
In the following section we describe the methodology we used in
conducting this study and present descriptive statistics on unions and the use
of ADR by the corporations in our sample. We then present the results of our
statistical analysis, followed by a discussion of our interpretation of those
results. In brief, we find that the relationship between unions and ADR in
major U.S. corporations is a nuanced one. Although we cannot dismiss
entirely the role of union avoidance, we find that union complementarity is
more useful in explaining the corporation's adoption of ADR practices and
systems. We find that the distinction between entirely nonunion corporations
and partially unionized corporations is an important one. In many nonunion
firms the threat of unionization is virtually nonexistent, and so unionism
plays no role in the employer's choice of a conflict management strategy. By
contrast, in partially unionized firms management must weigh its relations
with unions carefully in crafting an ADR strategy for its nonunion
employees. We uncover strong evidence that a company's experience with
collective bargaining significantly colors its views of various ADR practices.
We also find that the strategic priority that management attaches to
improving and controlling workplace relationships influences its decisions
regarding the adoption of ADR.
II. TOWARD CONCEPTUAL CLARITY ON THE ROLE OF UNIONISM
The growing use of ADR to resolve workplace disputes over the last four
decades occurred simultaneously with the decline in union membership as a
proportion of the workforce (often referred to as union density). From its
peak of 35% of wage and salary workers in 1954, union density steadily
declined and in 2011 reached 11.8%.6 It would be easy to jump to the
conclusion that the simultaneous decline of unionism and rise of ADR are
causally linked. A major purpose of this paper is to use empirical data to
examine whether and to what extent that link exists. But we also know that
there are other factors that explain the relative decline of unionism, and those
factors do not necessarily match the factors that explain the rise of ADR. For
example, a major reason for the decline of unionism in the U.S. is the decline
of employment in the smokestack industries, the industries hit hardest by
international competition and deindustrialization. Whether the shift from a
6 News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members - 2011 (2012),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf.
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manufacturing to an information economy helps explain the rise of ADR,
however, is at best problematic. 7 To understand the relationship between
unions and ADR, it is useful to trace briefly the evolution of collective
bargaining in the U.S.
A. The Evolution of Collective Bargaining
The origins of collective bargaining in the U.S. can be traced to the 19th
century, but the contemporary industrial relations system has its roots in the
rise of unionism during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Unions
successfully organized production workers in autos, steel, rubber, electrical
appliances, and other industries during the 1930s and 1940s. The passage of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or Wagner Act) in 1935 gave
private sector workers the right to join unions and engage in collective
bargaining,8 and most scholars agree the law significantly assisted unions in
their efforts to organize the unorganized.9 Union organizing efforts during
this period were usually characterized by considerable turmoil and often by
violence.' 0 After the United States entered World War II, policy makers
7 There are numerous discussions of the relative decline of unionism in the United
States over the past 50 years. See, e.g., LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 63-69.
8 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2010).
9 Barry T. Hirsch & Edward J. Schumacher, Private Section Union Density and the
Wage Premium: Past, Present, and Future, 22 J. OF LAB. RES. 487, 487 (2001)
("Following a dramatic spurt in unionization after passage of the depression-era National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) of 1935, union density peaked in the mid-1950s, and then
began a continuous decline. At the end of the century, the percentage of private wage and
salary workers who were union members was less than 10 percent, not greatly different
from union density prior to the NLRA."); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing
Workers'Rights to Self-Organize under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REv. 1769, 1771 (1983)
("When the NLRA was enacted in 1935, union density-the ratio of union membership
to the nonagricultural work force -was only 13%. In just one decade, union density
nearly tripled, reaching 35%."). Weiler obtained union density data for the United States
for the period 1935-1955 from GEORGE BAIN & ROBERT PRICE, PROFILES ON UNION
GROWTH 88-89 (1980).
10 Two standard sources on the history of the American labor movement before
World War II are PHILLIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1964) and
WALTER GALENSON, THE CIO CHALLENGE TO THE AFL: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
LABOR MOVEMENT, 1935-1941 (1960). Both books document the many strikes that
occurred during union organizing campaigns in the 1930s. Many of these strikes resulted
in violent clashes between workers and police. For example, the newly formed United
Automobile Workers engaged in a sit-down strike (that is, the workers occupied the
plants and refused to work) at General Motors plants in 1937. At the Flint, Michigan GM
plant, on January 11, strikers and city police engaged in a violent confrontation.
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sought a means of bringing order out of the chaos that existed in many
industries. " By the end of World War II, both employers and unions were
eager to develop "processes and procedures that would serve to resolve
conflict and regulate employment relationships."1 2 At a White House
conference convened by President Truman in the fall of 1945, major union
and business leaders agreed that the use of mediation and arbitration should
be encouraged to resolve labor disputes.13
For nearly thirty years following World War II, a broad if fragile
consensus prevailed at many work sites: "Managers would recognize the
legitimacy of unions, unions would restrict their concerns to well-defined
workplace issues, and government would be the impartial arbiter, helping to
ensure a level playing field."l 4 The so-called "New Deal system of industrial
relations" called for the use of mediation to resolve interest disputes (disputes
involving the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement) and
arbitration to resolve rights disputes (disputes involving the application and
interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement). 15
By the 1970s, however, the New Deal system of industrial relations was
beginning to break down. Globalization, international competition,
According to Galenson, "[F]or hours the strikers battled the police, fighting clubs, tear
gas, and riot guns with such improvised weapons as two-pound car door hinges and
streams of water from fire hoses. The news of the riot spread, and the strikers were
reinforced by thousands of supporters who poured into Flint." Fourteen strikers suffered
bullet wounds, and the confrontation became known as "The Battle of the Running
Bulls." Id. at 137-38.
11 On December 17, 1941-ten days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor-
President Roosevelt signed an executive order establishing the National War Labor
Board, which was given the task of "adjusting and settling labor disputes which might
interrupt work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war." TAFT, supra
note 10, at 546.
12 LIPSKY ET AL, supra note 1, at 43 ("By the end of World War II, both labor and
management in the United States were anxious to rationalize and bring order to a chaotic
workplace. Both sides were willing to develop processes and procedures that would serve
to regulate employment relationships. The New Deal version of the social contract was
the consequence of these shared objectives.").
13 Harry C. Katz & David B. Lipsky, The Collective Bargaining System in the
United States: The Legacy and the Lessons, in INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AT THE DAWN OF
THE NEW MILLENNIUM 145-61 (Maurice F. Neufeld & Jean T. McKelvey eds., 1998)
(providing a full account of Truman's 1945 White House conference).
14 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 43.
15 THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERiCAN INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS 21-46 (1986) (The term "New Deal system of industrial relations" is closely
associated with this book, which is a classic treatment of the forces that destabilized that
system).
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technological change, and the deregulation of several major industries were
some of the important factors undercutting the New Deal system. The decline
of manufacturing industries, the growth of white-collar jobs, the change in
the composition of the workforce (which now featured a growing proportion
of women and minorities), and the statutory protection of individual rights
were other factors that served to weaken unions and undercut collective
bargaining. Scholars generally agree that the transformation of the workplace
that took root in the 1970s was an important determinant of the rise of ADR
to resolve workplace disputes.16
At the risk of oversimplification, contemporary employers have a choice
of two strategies in dealing with unions. They can accept the legitimacy of
unions and work with them through collective bargaining (admittedly, quite
often in an adversarial relationship, but sometimes in a collaborative one). 17
Alternatively, they can pursue policies, sometimes aggressively, designed to
avoid unions or eliminate them from their facilities.18 We hypothesize that
16 See, e.g., KOCHAN ET AL., supra note 15, at 38-45 (providing an excellent
discussion of the factors that undermined the U.S. industrial relations system in the 1960s
and 1970s); LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 54-73 (linking the destabilization of the New
Deal industrial relations system in the 1970s to the rise of ADR).
17 There are numerous accounts of both collaborative and adversarial collective
bargaining relationships in the industrial relations literature. For a discussion of collective
bargaining relationships in the pulp and paper industry, the automobile supply industry,
and the railroad industry, see RICHARD E. WALTON ET AL., STRATEGIC NEGOTIATIONS: A
THEORY OF CHANGE IN LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS 67-210 (1994). For a
discussion of the change from adversarial to more cooperative labor-management
relations in the automobile industry, see HARRY C. KATZ, SHIFTING GEARS: CHANGING
LABOR RELATIONS IN THE U.S. AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY 167-74 (1985). For an account of
the development of collaborative relations between Kaiser Permanente and its unions, see
THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., HEALING TOGETHER: THE LABOR-MANAGEMENT
PARTNERSHIP AT KAISER PERMANENTE (2009).
18 A turning point in U.S. labor relations occurred in 1981, when air traffic
controllers engaged in an illegal strike against the federal government. President Reagan
fired all of the striking air traffic controllers, thereby destroying their union. For an
account of this episode, see ROBERT HUTCHENS ET AL., STRIKERS AND SUBSIDIES: THE
INFLUENCE OF GOVERNMENT TRANSFER PROGRAMS ON STRIKE ACTIVITY 59-68 (1989).
After the air traffic controllers strike, some employers adopted the practice of dismissing
employees who went on strike and hiring replacements. In 1983, the owners of
Greyhound bus lines hired replacement drivers when their regular drivers went on strike
in an effort to eliminate the union. See Peter T. Kilborn, Money Isn 't Everything in
Greyhound Strike, N.Y. TIMES, April 9, 1990, at Al. See also, Michael Hoyt, Downtime
for Labor: Are Working People Less Equal than Others--Or Is Labor Just a Dead Beat?,
22 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 36, 36-40 (1984).
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this choice of strategies by employers affects their adoption and use of ADR
practices.
B. External and Internal Factors Influencing the Use ofADR
In explaining the rise of ADR, some researchers have made a distinction
between the role of factors external to the organization (or exogenous
factors) and the role of factors within the organization (internal or
endogenous factors).19 For example, several scholars have advanced the
argument that the adoption of ADR practices is, first and foremost, a reaction
by organizations to the external pressure created by the passage of several
significant workplace statutes in the 1960s and 1970s (such as Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967, and the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970). These statutes,
some claim, led to a dramatic increase in employment litigation, and this so-
called "litigation explosion" pushed organizations to develop dispute
resolution practices that buffered them from the pressures of the public
judicial system. 20
Others scholars have argued that, in addition to external pressures,
internal factors shaped the organizational adoption of ADR practices by U.S.
employers. 21 For example, over the last three decades, many employers have
restructured the way in which work is performed in their organizations.
A hallmark of the reorganization of the workplace is the decline in the
importance of hierarchy and the rise of team-based work. Many U.S.
employers have discovered that employee performance and productivity can
19 The distinction between internal and external factors is a key part of the analysis
developed in LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 117-52; see also, David B. Lipsky et al.,
"The Antecedents of Workplace Conflict Management Systems in U.S. Corporations:
Evidence from a New Survey of Fortune 1000 Companies," (July 2, 2012) (paper
prepared for the 16th World Congress of the International Labor and Employment
Relations Association).
20 WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAWSUIT 131-57 (1991). For a more skeptical view of the
authenticity of the so-called "litigation explosion," see Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers,
Corporations in Court: Big Business Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 L.
& Soc. INQUIRY 497, 497-592 (1996).
21 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 133-138. Among the internal factors identified by
the authors of this book are organizational cultures, management commitment, and
management responses to major lawsuits.
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be enhanced if employees are empowered to assume more responsibility for
the manner in which they perform their work.22
In many organizations the reorganization of the workplace-particularly
the movement to team-based work-was associated with the employer's
introduction of ADR.23
C. Union Avoidance
The distinction between external factors and internal factors, however,
does not fit the role that unionism plays in the adoption of ADR practices.
Unionism is both an external and an internal factor in affecting the
employer's decision making on ADR. On the one hand, much of the ADR
literature views unionization as an external "threat" that has had a strong
influence on decisions by employers to adopt ADR. Union avoidance is often
viewed as a major motive underlying the employer's use of ADR. According
to this perspective, organizations seeking to avoid unionization are more
likely to adopt ADR practices, thereby providing their employees with a
nonunion version of what unions deliver to their members. The threat of
unionization, according to this argument, is likely to increase the use of ADR
by a nonunion employer or by an employer who is partially unionized.24
22 Id. at 65.
23 Id. at 65-69; Colvin, supra note 3.
24 Rosemary Batt, Alexander J.S. Colvin & Jeffrey Keefe, Employee Voice, Human
Resource Practices, and Quit Rates: Evidence from the Telecommunications Industry, 55
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 573, 589 (2002) ("Prior research suggests that firms adopt
dispute resolution procedures as a union avoidance strategy. To the degree that this is
true, we would expect nonunion dispute resolution procedures to be particularly strong in
this industry [telecommunications] because the threat of union organizing is high. In
addition, we examined stronger forms of nonunion procedures, including nonunion
arbitration and peer review panels. Even with this relatively favorable setting for
nonunion procedures, we found no statistically significant results for nonunion arbitration
procedures and only marginally significant results for peer review procedures, which
were not robust with respect to alternative specifications of the model.") (citation
omitted); Colvin, supra note 3, at 380-81 ("The threat of unionization can strongly
influence the organizational practices of nonunion employers. . . . The ability of peer
review panels to function legally within the confines of the general legislative prohibition
on nonunion employee representation plans creates a strong institutional incentive for
employers to adopt this form of employee involvement in dispute resolution to help
forestall threats of unionization.").
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For example, Wal-Mart, the world's largest company, famously pursues
aggressive strategies to avoid unionization. 25 One of the strategies Wal-Mart
uses to avoid unionization is its Open Door Policy, initially introduced in the
1970s, which the corporation promotes as a means for employees to voice
their concerns and as a mechanism for improving relations between
management and workers. In the research we report in this paper, we
discovered that 91% of Fortune 1000 companies use open door policies,
which are often viewed as a keystone of their ADR portfolio. In our data,
however, it is not evident that most corporations use open door policies as a
union avoidance technique. But according to a report by Human Rights
Watch, "At its core, the Open Door Policy is motivated by Wal-Mart's
hostility to worker organizing. . . . The policy affords [Wal-Mart] the
opportunity to tell its employees that 'third party representation' is not
necessary, as they are allegedly able to bring their concerns directly to
management." 26 According to Human Rights Watch, Wal-Mart instructs its
managers to achieve the company's goal of avoiding unionization by using
the Open Door Policy to assure employees (called associates by Wal-Mart)
that "at any time, at any level, in any location [they] may communicate
verbally or in writing with any member of management up to the president,
in confidence, without fear of retaliation." 27 When faced with a unionization
drive, Wal-Mart managers have told their employees "[t]here is no reason
that associates need a union. They don't need representation because if they
have concerns, they can go directly to management, and if that doesn't work,
they can go higher up." 28
D. Union Complementarity
In past research on workplace ADR union avoidance has been found to
be one of the factors motivating management's adoption of ADR practices
and systems, but it is not necessarily the only factor or even a major factor. In
fact, for many companies the adoption of workplace ADR has been driven by
other factors much more significant than union avoidance, most notably
25 For one account of Wal-Mart's anti-union policies, see Erin Johansson, Checking
Out: The Rise of Wal-Mart and the Fall of Middle Class Retailing Jobs, 39 CONN. L.
REV. 1461, 1461-91 (2007). For another account of Wal-Mart's policies, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, DISCOUNTING RIGHTS: WAL-MART'S VIOLATION OF U.S. WORKERS'
RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION (2007).
26 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 25, at 79-80.
2 7 Id. at 80.
2 8 Id. at 81.
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management's desire to avoid the time and costs associated with litigation.29
All of these factors-some external to the organization and others internal-
have arguably led to the rise of ADR and to a historic transformation in the
means used by employers to manage workplace conflict. In the context of the
dramatic changes that have transformed employment relations in the U.S., it
remains unclear precisely what role unions and collective bargaining have
played in the rise of ADR.
It is quite possible that companies that have engaged in collective
bargaining with unions have learned (or at least developed the perception)
that the effects of collective bargaining on the management of the company
have not all been negative. Case studies of collaborative relationships
between unions and employers have documented the positive effects of
unions on management practices. 30 Research demonstrates that the presence
of unions within an organization has clear implications for internal
organizational structures and practices. Unions affect a host of internal
factors within an organization, from skills development and training practices
to the institutionalization of career ladders and seniority rules.31
Furthermore-and central to the question of ADR adoption-unions
institutionalize a grievance procedure for unionized employees, which
scholars such as Freeman and Medoff believe is the principal means by
which unions provide "voice" for the employees they represent.32 It is
possible, if not likely, that a grievance procedure established under collective
bargaining augments the awareness of the employer's nonunion employees
about the benefits of voice mechanisms, including other dispute resolution
practices. According to this argument, unions affect the diffusion of dispute
resolution practices to nonunion employees not by acting as an external
threat but by serving as an internal motivator.
On the one hand, in a corporation that has both unionized and nonunion
facilities, the firm's experience with mediation, fact-finding, arbitration, and
other dispute resolution techniques used under collective bargaining in its
unionized facilities may lead it to believe that extending the use of those
techniques to its nonunion facilities may be a worthwhile idea. It is possible
29 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 101-05; Lipsky et al., supra note 19.
30 A classic work on this topic is SUMNER SLICHTER ET AL., THE IMPACT OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING ON MANAGEMENT 859-68 (1960); see also, supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
31 SLICHTER ET AL., supra note 30, at 59-141, 178-210.
32 A landmark work on union voice is RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF,
WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 103-09 (1984); another important book on the importance of the
grievance procedure in providing voice for employees is JAMES W. KUHN, BARGAINING
IN GRIEVANCE SETTLEMENT (1961).
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that the experience the firm has under collective bargaining may also alert it
to the downside of those dispute resolution techniques and affect the way it
shapes the use of the techniques for its nonunion facilities. In either case, we
maintain, the firm views the adoption of ADR as a complement to collective
bargaining, and not as a means of undercutting it in its unionized facilities or
avoiding it in its nonunion facilities.
On the other hand, a corporation that has both unionized and nonunion
facilities may view the use of ADR in its nonunion facilities as a strategy to
avoid the unionization of those facilities. For example, in 2003 the Raytheon
Corporation, a major defense contractor headquartered in Waltham,
Massachusetts, established a comprehensive "Alternative Dispute Resolution
Program."33 The new program was intended principally for production
employees at Raytheon's nonunion facilities. 34 At the time, Raytheon
consisted of eight major divisions and employed 80,000 employees at
numerous plants in both the U.S. and abroad. At many of its plants the
production employees were represented either by the United Steelworkers or
the International Association of Machinists. But a significant number of the
corporation's facilities remained nonunion. In presentations made by the
director of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Program at conferences and
other venues, he candidly acknowledged that one of management's major
33 News Release, Raytheon, Raytheon Enters EEOC's National ADR 'Referral
Back' Program: Defense/Aerospace Leader Joints Other Major Firms in Employing
Innovative Program (April 21, 2004), available at
www.investor.raytheon.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=84193&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=5
17282&highlight= (last visited July 25, 2012); Linda Cinciotta, Alternative Dispute
Resolution Comes of Age in the Federal Government, (Oct. 28, 2003),
http://www.justice.gov/odr/aatllegalcenter102803.htm ("The private sector
faces a comparable problem, but for a different reason. Corporations are pressured by the
competitive and global economy. They must find a workable solution to cut the cost of
their workplace conflict. Many of them are doing so by adopting integrated systems that
allow them to manage conflict, not just disputes. These integrated conflict management
systems anticipate conflict and try to intervene with it before the conflict develops into
real problems. Our former Associate Attorney General, now your colleague, Jay B.
Stephens (Vice President and General Counsel at Raytheon Co.) is providing a good
example. Raytheon's new workplace ADR program is a proactive systems approach, and
the Raytheon program leaflet describes it well: 'The ADR process is not about winning; it
is about fair and responsible reconciliation and restoring relationships, when different
views of a situation bring people into conflict."').
34 In 2003-06, the director of Raytheon's ADR program was Warren Cunningham.
Mr. Cunningham made two presentations about Raytheon's program at classes taught by
two of the authors of this paper (Avgar and Lipsky). Much of what we know about the
Raytheon program was obtained from our conversations with Mr. Cunningham and from
the PowerPoint presentations that he used in our classes.
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motives for introducing an advanced ADR program was the corporation's
desire to avoid the unionization of its nonunion facilities. In the corporation's
view, the provision of a fair and equitable system for resolving employee
disputes would be perceived by its nonunion employees as an attractive
substitute for collective bargaining.35
We cannot test directly the role that either union avoidance or union
complementarity may have played in prompting large U.S. employers to
adopt ADR practices (in large part because the vast majority of these
employers will not admit publicly-or in surveys-that union avoidance was
one of their major motivations). However, our statistical results will allow us
to make reasonable inferences about employer motives, including union
avoidance, for introducing ADR. We now turn to the methods and data we
use in our analysis.
III. DATA AND METHODS
In 2011, the Scheinman Institute on Conflict Resolution at Cornell
completed a comprehensive survey of the use of ADR by Fortune 1000
firms. The survey was co-sponsored by the International Institute for Conflict
Prevention and Resolution (CPR) and the Straus Institute for Dispute
Resolution at Pepperdine University, and it was administered by Cornell's
Survey Research Institute (SRI). Cornell conducted a similar survey in 1997;
that survey documented: (1) the growing use of ADR, especially arbitration
and mediation, to resolve workplace disputes; (2) the corporate preference
for interest-based (rather than rights-based) methods of resolving disputes;
and (3) the emergence of a new phenomenon, namely, integrated conflict
management systems.36 The vast majority of Fortune 1000 firms in 1997
relied on mediation and arbitration to resolve employment disputes, but they
were also using a variety of other techniques to handle such disputes,
including fact-finding, med-arb, and nonunion grievance procedures. 37
The 1997 survey was the first to document the emergence of integrated
conflict management systems in U.S. corporations. Although there is no
35 Course presentations by Warren Cunningham, former ADR Director, Raytheon
(2003-2006). In 2006, Mr. Cunningham left the Raytheon Corporation and became a
human resource executive at the Wal-Mart Corporation.
36 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1. An earlier version of this section of the paper
appeared as David B. Lipsky, How Corporate America Uses Conflict Management: The
Evidence from a New Survey of the Fortune 1000, 30 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST
OF LITIG. 139 (2012). We thank CPR for permission to reprint portions of that article
here.
37 Id. at 82.
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standard definition of a conflict management system, there is widespread
recognition that a system differs from a practice or technique in four ways:
(1) a system entails a comprehensive, proactive approach to managing and
resolving conflict in an organization; (2) a system has a broad scope,
allowing many different types of disputes (statutory, nonstatutory, etc.) to be
heard and resolved; (3) a system provides multiple access points for
employees who have complaints (e.g., an employee can file a complaint with
his supervisor, the human resource function, the counsel's office, or the
office that manages the system); and (4) a system provides multiple options
for resolving disputes (e.g., both interest-based and rights-based methods). 38
On the basis of the 1997 survey, Lipsky et al., estimated that about 17% of
Fortune 1000 companies had all or most of the features of an integrated
conflict management system. 39
In the 2011 survey of the Fortune 1000, the co-sponsors had the
objective of replicating in part the 1997 survey but also wanted to add some
new survey items designed to capture ADR developments that had occurred
since the first survey was conducted. Also, the 1997 survey had not asked
respondents about the level or status of unionism in their organizations.
Indeed, the earlier survey contained no information on the corporation's
collective bargaining relationships. The co-sponsors of the 2011 survey very
much wanted to explore the relationship between unions and ADR, and
therefore, they filled some of the gaps that existed in the previous survey.
In both the 1997 and 2011 surveys, the objective was to interview the
general counsel (GC) in each of the Fortune 1000 corporations. If we could
38 In 1999, the Society for Professionals in Dispute Resolution (SPIDR) appointed
an eleven-person committee to develop a definition of a so called "integrated conflict
management system" and to provide guidelines for the design and implementation of
such systems; the committee was co-chaired by Ann Gosline and Lamont Stallworth
(Lipsky was a member of the committee). The SPIDR committee's report was published
by Cornell's Institute on Conflict Resolution in 2001. See Ann Gosline et al., Designing
Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision
Makers in Organizations, 4 CORNELL STUD. IN CONFLICT AND DISP. RESOL. 135, 135-46
(2001). The definition of an integrated conflict management system developed by the
SPIDR committee was subsequently adopted by Lipsky and his co-authors. See LIPSKY
ET AL., supra note 1, at 11-19.
39 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 126. The authors classified large U.S. corporations
as having one of three possible conflict management strategies, which they label
"contend," "settle," and "prevent." "[C]ompanies that we have classified as having a
prevent strategy have either adopted a full-blown conflict management system or have
adopted a policy of using ADR in all types of disputes and have implemented many of
the features of a full-blown system." Seventeen percent of the corporations in their
sample fell into the "prevent" category. Id. at 147.
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not interview the GC, we attempted to interview one of the GC's top
deputies. In 1997 we obtained interviews with attorneys in 606 of the Fortune
1000 firms; in 2011 we obtained interviews with attorneys in 368 of these
companies. The director of SRI believes that the decline in the response rate
in the new survey was the consequence of so-called "survey fatigue," which
she reported had affected most of the surveys conducted by SRI. In
comparing the characteristics (revenue, number of employees, and industry)
of our sample of corporations with the characteristics of all of the Fortune
1000 corporations, we found that our sample is an. excellent cross-section of
the larger group.
The results of the new survey provide a rich tapestry of data on the use of
ADR and conflict management systems by the corporations in our sample.
They also provide a basis for comparing the ADR policies and practices
pursued by major corporations in 2011 with the policies and practices
pursued by major corporations in 1997. In this paper, we do not tap into all of
the data resources at our disposal. To achieve our objective of understanding
the relationship between unions and ADR, we need only provide a brief
summary of our survey results. Table 1 shows the proportion of employees
covered by ADR practices in the corporations in our sample. The most
surprising finding in the table is that 43% of our respondents reported that
none of their employees were covered by ADR practices. However, in a
significant proportion of these corporations, 40%, at least some of the
employees were represented by unions and covered by a collective
bargaining agreement. In about one-fifth of the corporations, more than 75%
of the employees were covered by ADR practices. In sum, there is
extraordinary variation in both the proportion of employees covered by ADR
practices and the proportion covered by unions in these corporations.
Table 1. Proportion of Corporation's Employees Covered by ADR
Proportion of Percentage of
Employees Covered by ADR Companies
More than 75% 19.0
Between 51 and 75% 3.5
Between 26 and 50% 3.5
Between l and 25% 19.4
Zero 43.3
Don't know 11.3
Figure 1 provides a comparison of various types of ADR practices used
by major U.S. corporations in 1997 and 2011. It is important to note that this
comparison includes not only employment disputes but also consumer,
commercial, and other types of corporate disputes. Also, some caution must
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be used in interpreting the results because there was a significant change in
the companies included in the Fortune 1000 in 1997 and the companies
included in 2011. For example, there was a marked decline in the number of
manufacturing companies included in the newer list, and a marked increase
in the number of retail and wholesale trade, finance, and insurance
companies. Lastly, note that Figure 1 shows the proportion of corporations
that used a particular technique at least once in the previous three years. This
particular metric, of course, is only one of several that might be used to
gauge the frequency of ADR use. In fact, we know that the majority of
corporations in our sample used some of the techniques (particularly
arbitration and mediation) numerous times within the previous three years.
[See Figure 1]
Figure 1 shows that the vast majority of corporations in 1997 and 2011
relied on mediation and arbitration as techniques to resolve workplace and
other disputes. In fact, the figure shows that the proportion of companies
using mediation increased from 87% to 98% over the course of 14 years.
There was also a discernible increase in the proportion of companies using
fact-finding and med-arb. Of special note is the finding that the proportion of
corporations having an ombuds function increased from 10% to 14%-in
relative terms, a 40% increase. In the contemporary organization, the ombuds
office is frequently the hub of a conflict management system. Also note that
Figure 1 includes two techniques (early neutral evaluation and early case
assessment) that were not included in our 1997 survey. These techniques
were novel ones in 1997, but Figure 1 shows that by 2011 they had become
prominent in the ADR portfolio.
Our 2011 results show that the use of mediation by Fortune 1000
corporations had remained relatively stable across a variety of disputes
(employment, commercial, consumer, etc.) over a 14-year period. However, our
results reveal a noteworthy decline in the use of arbitration across a variety of
disputes. Figure 2 shows that the proportion of corporations that reported using
employment arbitration at least once in the previous three years declined from
62% to 38/o-in relative terms, about a 40% decline. Note also that Figure 2
shows that the use of arbitration in construction disputes declined from 40% to
22%, while the use of arbitration in commercial disputes declined from 85% to
62%. It is possible that a major reason for the decline in the use of arbitration
was the recession that began in 2008, but we lack the data to test this
proposition. The respondents in our survey provided other reasons for the
decline in the use of arbitration. Many of them believe that arbitration has
increasingly become similar to litigation, and they suggest that "external law"
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(relevant statutes and court cases) has made arbitration more costly, complex,
and time-consuming. Our new survey confirms the findings of our 1997 survey,
namely, that corporate attorneys prefer to use mediation and other interest-based
options (rather than arbitration and other rights-based options) to resolve
employment and other types of disputes.
[See Figure 2]
Another possible reason for the decline in the use of employment
arbitration is the rise in the use of conflict management systems in U.S.
corporations. Among the hallmarks of a conflict management system, as we
have noted, is their emphasis on resolving employment disputes within the
organization, using internal dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than
resorting to outside arbitrators or mediators to resolve such disputes. As
previously noted, on the basis of our 1997 survey, we estimated that about
17% of the Fortune 1000 corporations used a conflict management system. A
major objective of our 2011 survey was to discover how many corporations
had adopted and were currently using a conflict management system. We
included several questions in our survey instrument designed to provide an
estimate of the use of such systems by major corporations. The metrics
needed to make such an estimate, however, have proven to be laden with
ambiguities and definitional difficulties that make arriving at a precise
estimate challenging. In part, this is because there is no standard definition of
a "conflict management system," and many corporate attorneys and other
practitioners view the use of ADR techniques (such as arbitration and
mediation) as synonymous with the use of a system. Thus, when we asked
our respondents, "Do you believe your company has a conflict management
system?" about 67% answered "yes." Fortunately, the inclusion of other
items in our survey instrument that covered core characteristics of an
authentic conflict management system allowed us to develop more valid
estimates of the proportion of our respondents that actually had a system.
For example, we asked each respondent whether his or her company had
"an office or function dedicated to managing your dispute resolution
program." About 38% answered "yes" to this question. Although some
systems are managed directly by the corporate counsel's office or by the
human resource function, past research suggests that the most fully
developed systems are managed by independent or semi-autonomous offices
within the organization. These offices often are given names intended to
suggest their central function; Prudential's conflict management system, for
example, was managed under the rubric "Roads to Resolution," and was
headed by a vice president who was also the corporation's chief ethics
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officer.40 The U.S. Postal Service has "Redress," General Electric has
"Resolve," Alcoa has "Resolve It," PECO Energy has "PEOPLE* SOLVE,"
and other organizations use other names. 41 As we previously mentioned,
corporations are increasingly using an ombudsman to manage a conflict
management system. This list of examples suggests that conflict management
systems exist in both nonunion corporations (Prudential) and in heavily
unionized ones (GE, Alcoa, and PECO). By using other data in our survey,
we were able to refine further our estimate of the number of corporations in
our sample that have either all or most of the characteristics of an authentic
conflict management system. Our best estimate is that roughly one-third of
the corporations have a system. In our statistical analysis, we examined the
relationship between union status and the existence of a conflict management
system; no matter how we defined a "system," however, we could not find a
significant relationship between that phenomenon and union status.
Our survey results disclose considerable variation in the use of ADR and
conflict management systems in Fortune 1000 corporations. Although as
many as one-third of these companies use a form of a conflict management
system, our results suggest that as many as 40% rarely use any ADR
techniques and continue to rely largely on traditional methods (including
litigation) to resolve disputes. Our findings also show that major U.S.
corporations that rely on ADR have adopted a wider array of ADR
techniques over the past 14 years, including so called "hotlines," open door
policies, early neutral evaluation, early case assessment, and conflict
coaching. Is there a relationship between the variation in ADR practices and
systems used by Fortune 1000 corporations and the union status of those
corporations? Our statistical results provide an answer to that question.
40 For discussion of the Prudential conflict management system, see LIPSKY ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 147-152.
41 For a discussion of the dispute resolution program at the U.S. Postal Service, see
Lisa B. Binghamet al., Highlights of Mediation at Work: The Report of the National
REDRESS Evaluation Project of the United States Postal Service, 18 NEGOTIATION
JOURNAL 1, 136-59 (2002); for a discussion of the program at General Electric, see Mark
Nordstrom, General Electric's Experience with ADR, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK 53RD
ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF LABOR 197-226 (Samuel Estreicher & David Sherwyn eds.,
2004); for a discussion of the program at Alcoa, see Dale C. Perdue, Employment
Dispute: Resolve It! Alcoa at the Forefront of Alternative Dispute Resolution, in
ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NEW YORK 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF LABOR 233-234 (Samuel Estreicher & David
Sherwyn eds., 2004); and for a discussion of the program at PECO Energy, see LIPSKY ET
AL., supra note 1 at 148-150.
80
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
UNIONS AND ADR
IV. STATISTICAL FINDINGS
In this section we use the data we obtained from our survey of Fortune
1000 corporations to analyze the relationship between the union status of the
corporation and several critical dimensions of the corporation's ADR
practices and policies, specifically: (1) the ADR practices (arbitration, med-
arb, nonunion grievance procedures, etc.) that it uses to resolve disputes with
its nonunion workforce; (2) the extent to which its nonunion employees are
covered by its ADR practices and policies; and (3) the reasons (given by
respondents in our survey) the company chooses to use (or not to use)
various ADR practices and policies.
A. Mean Number ofADR Practices and Union Status
In Table 2, we compare the mean number of total nonunion ADR
practices found in each of the Fortune 1000 companies contained in our
sample, differentiating between companies with and without some union
presence. Respondents were asked if their firm used each of the following
practices among their nonunion workforce: mediation, fact-finding,
arbitration, med-arb, peer review, mini-trials, in-house grievance systems,
early neutral evaluation, or early case assessment. Answers were aggregated
for each firm to create a continuous index of practices, from zero to nine.
Table 2: Mean Number of Fortune 1000 ADR Practices and Union
Status of Firms
Union Mean Sid. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means (% Error Means (%
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion 4.33 .195 -0.16 (- 4.70 .212 -0.13
Union 4.17 .184 3.7%) 4.58 .197 (-2.6%)
Controls No Yes
Included? 4 2 I
*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *
significant at the .10 level.
42 Controls consist of exogenous and endogenous factors that might influence the
number of ADR practices a firm employs, such as the firm's size and industry, the firm's
strategic approach and commitment to ADR, and the firm's employee productivity.
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About 54% of surveyed firms indicated that they had some union
presence in the company. These unionized firms offered, on average, 4.17
different ADR practices to their nonunion employees. Nonunion firms in our
sample, however, provided a mean of 4.33 practices to their workforce.
Taken in purely descriptive terms, this figure appears to suggest that
nonunion companies provided 3.7% greater numbers of practices than
unionized companies.
However, what appears to be a difference between the two groups of
companies does not withstand even the most basic statistical test. Running a
bivariate means comparison of the two groups reveals that there is no
statistical difference between the mean values. To confirm this finding of
nonsignificance, we ran a more sophisticated quantitative analysis, called a
generalized linear regression, which allowed us to control for a variety of
exogenous and endogenous factors we believed might predict how many
ADR practices a firm has. These controls included the firm's employment
size and industry, its strategic approach and commitment to ADR, and its
per-employee productivity levels (measured by total revenue per employee).
In using this analytical approach, we employ estimated marginal means to
compare unionized and nonunion firms after controlling for all the above
factors. We find that adding controls in fact lowers the mean difference
between the two groups to 2.6%, a result that is, of course, also
nonsignificant. In all, what might appear in descriptive terms to be a slight
reduction in the numbers of ADR practices available to employees at
unionized companies does not hold up under empirical scrutiny.
B. Individual ADR Practices and Union Status
Although the sheer number of practices a firm employs is not affected by
whether the firm is unionized, perhaps it is the case that the use of certain
individual practices, like arbitration, might be associated with a firm's union
status. Our second test disaggregates the portfolio of ADR options to test for
a relationship between unionism and single ADR practices. In this paper we
specifically highlight four practices: arbitration, med-arb, fact-finding, and
in-house grievance systems. 43 We use generalized logistic regressions, where
the dependent variable is dichotomized into a binary "yes" or "no" value, for
each practice. The results, found in Table 3, show the effects of union status
43 All practices were tested individually, with the exception of mediation. As the
vast majority of firms indicated that they used mediation, it was impossible to create a
model to explain variance between firms that used mediation and firms that did not.
Where models could be created, union status was not found to significantly predict
variance in any individual practices other than those reported in the table.
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on these variables, with and without controlling for other exogenous and
endogenous factors.
Table 3: Individual Fortune 1000 ADR Practices and the Union Status of
Firms
FORTUNE 1000 USE OF ARBITRATION
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means (% Error Means (%
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion .81 .034 +.06 .88 .041 +.06*
Union .87 .027 (+7.4%) .94 .024 (+6.8%)
Controls No Yes
Included?4 4
FORTUNE 1000 USE OF MED-ARB
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means ('% Error Means (%1
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion .58 .046 -.11* (- .68 .063 -. 19** (
Union .47 .043 19.0%) .49 .061 27.9%)
Controls No Yes
Included?
FORTUNE 1000 USE OF AN IN-HOUSE GRIEVANCE SYSTEM
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means (%1 Error Means (%1
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion .34 .044 +.14** .44 .079 +.11
Union .48 .043 (+41.2%) .55 .069 (+25.0%)
Controls No Yes
Included?
FORTUNE 1000 USE OF FACT-FINDING
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
44 Controls consist of exogenous and endogenous factors that might influence our
dependent variable, such as the firm's size and industry, the firm's strategic approach and
commitment to ADR, and the firm's employee productivity. Note that in all other
analyses we account for the extent to which the firm's industry has undergone
deregulation. When measuring arbitration effects, however, there is a collinear
relationship between union status and industry deregulation, so we exclude this variable
from our empirical analysis. When deregulation is included, union status becomes
nonsignificant, but the deregulation variable itself is not significant, implying
collinearity.
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Controls No Yes
Included?I
*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *
significant at the .10 level.
When considering union status alone, the results indicate that there is no
statistically significant difference in Fortune 1000 firms' use of arbitration
when considering divergent union statuses. However, more robust empirical
testing reveals an opposite result: there is, in fact, a relationship between the
unionization of a firm and its use of arbitration for its nonunion workforce.
After controlling for other factors, we find that unionized firms offered
nonunion employees arbitration 6.8% more often than nonunion firms. This
result is significant at the .10 level of analysis.
Firm use of med-arb tells a different story entirely; the results are also
found in Table 3. Without controlling for other factors, unionized firms
provided nonunion employees with a med-arb option at a rate 19% lower
than nonunion firms (p<.10). Adding in additional variables increases the
significance and magnitude of the difference between union status and med-
arb use; unionized companies employed med-arb 27.9% less often than did
nonunion companies.
We also consider whether firm unionization predicts the use of a
nonunion grievance system. Our initial findings, without controls, indicate
that companies with a union presence offered their nonunion employees a
grievance system at rates 41.2% higher than did firms with no union
presence. However, the statistical significance of this effect disappears when
accounting for the size of the firm and the industry in which it operates.
Our final individual ADR practice is the use of fact-finding. Initial
results, without controls, suggest that the unionization of a firm does not
appear to significantly influence its use of fact-finding among nonunion
employees. However, as with our results for arbitration, adding in other
controls changes the results. When considering the effects of several
exogenous and endogenous factors on fact-finding, the firm's union status
significantly and negatively influences the company's odds of having this
practice; unionized firms are 40.9% less likely to use fact-finding when
dealing with disputes among their nonunion workers.
The results indicate that the effects of union status on individual ADR
practices may be moderated by other variables, which help to increase or
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decrease the significance of the effects. For instance, hierarchical logistic
regressions indicate that the influence of union status on both arbitration and
med-arb may be moderated by the amount of ADR coverage the firm
provides. On the whole, the outcomes provide evidence that although the
total number of ADR practices offered by a firm is not influenced by
unionism, certain individual options are indeed influenced by the firm's
union status. (Some of these options, like arbitration, are critical components
of many companies' ADR systems.) Whereas unions are found to positively
influence a firm's use of arbitration for its nonunion employees, the opposite
is true for the more flexible med-arb and fact-finding options, which are
substantially more likely to be found among firms with no union presence.
C. Union Status and the Firm's Choice to Not Use Arbitration
In addition to considering the practices the Fortune 1000 corporations
employ to resolve disputes, our survey asked respondents to explain why
they did not use arbitration to resolve conflicts among their nonunion
workforce. We tested the extent to which a firm's unionization status could
predict its reasons for not using employment arbitration. The results of our
empirical analysis, with and without controls, are found in Table 4.
Table 4: Explanation for Fortune 1000 Firms that Do Not Use
Arbitration, by Union Status
ARBITRATION LEADS TO COMPROMISE OUTCOMES
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means (% Error Means (%
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion .38 .043 +.12** .45 .070 +.16**
Union .50 .040 (+31.6%) .61 .057 (+35.6%)
Controls No Yes
Included?
ARBITRATION IS TOO DIFFICULT TO APPEAL
Union Mean Std. Change in Mean Std. Change in
Status of Error Means (% Error Means (%
Firm Change) Change)
Nonunion .48 .045 +.10* .39 .069 +.15**
Union .58 .041 (+20.8%) .55 .058 (+41.0%)
Controls No Yes
Included?
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*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *
significant at the .10 level.
We analyze two possible reasons that might explain why a firm does not
use arbitration for its nonunion employees. First is the fact or perception that
arbitration can result in compromise outcomes, and second is the difficulty a
firm is likely to face in appealing arbitration awards. We find that the union
status of a company significantly influences both of these reasons for a firm's
decision to use techniques other than arbitration to resolve employment
disputes.
Regarding the firm's possible concern about arbitration resulting in
compromise outcomes, only 38% of the nonunion firms in our sample
suggested this was a reason they did not use employment arbitration.
However, exactly half of the unionized firms indicated that this was a reason
they did not use arbitration for their nonunion workers. This difference is
significant at the .05 level of analysis. When controlling for various factors
that might influence the firm's response to this question, our findings remain
robust. Indeed, when we control for size, industry, ADR coverage, and other
factors, the difference between union and nonunion firms that say that they
do not use arbitration because of the possibility of compromise outcomes
rises to 35.6%. Similarly, firms in the Fortune 1000 that have a union
presence, and therefore have had experience with arbitration, are much more
likely than nonunion firms to cite the difficulty of appealing arbitrators'
decisions as a reason for not using arbitration with their nonunion employees.
Whereas less than half of the nonunion firms in our sample indicate that the
difficulty of appeal is a reason why they do not use arbitration, almost 60%
of the unionized firms say this is an influential factor. This difference is
magnified when we control for other variables in addition to union status
(though the result is significant both with and without controls).
D. ADR Coverage and Union Status
We believed that other features of a firm's dispute resolution practices, in
addition to the number of ADR practices available to employees and the
firm's reasons for using or not using certain ADR techniques, would also be
needed to tell the full story of the connection between unions and workplace
dispute resolution in the Fortune 1000. For example, we hypothesized that
the union status of a firm would influence the extent to which its nonunion
workers are covered by ADR. Our next model examines this relationship.
Table 5 provides descriptive comparisons of ADR coverage levels
between union and nonunion companies and uses a simple statistical test,
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namely, the x2 test. The descriptive results suggest a considerable difference
in ADR coverage levels depending on the union status of a company. The
absence of any ADR coverage in nonunion firms was 45.3% higher than the
absence of ADR coverage in union firms. By equal measure, unionized
companies provided low to moderate amounts of nonunion employee ADR
coverage (that is, coverage from one to 25% of the workforce) at levels
96.6% higher than nonunion firms. Finally, union companies also provided
greater ADR coverage for large shares of nonunion workers (26% or more),
at levels 15% higher than nonunion firms. These differences in coverage by
union status are confirmed as statistically significant, with a Pearson x test
indicating significance at the .01 level of analysis.
Table 5: Crosstabs between the Level of ADR Coverage in the Fortune
1000 and Union Status
ADR Coverage Percent of Percent of Percentage Point
Level Nonunion Union Change (% Change)
Firms Firms
No Coverage 58.1 40.0 Nonunion +18.1
(+45.3%)
One to 25% 14.5 28.5 Union +14.0
Coverage (+96.6%)
26% or More 27.4 31.5 Union +4.1
Coverage (+15%)
Pearson X: 9.994 (significant at .01 level)
In the absence of controls, however, it is difficult to determine whether
unionization is in fact causally related to larger levels of nonunion ADR
coverage in the Fortune 1000. To determine more robustly this relationship,
we employ generalized ordinal regressions on our data, controlling for other
factors that might affect ADR coverage, such as the company's industry,
size, location, strategic approach to ADR, and employee productivity. We
compare these results against a model that includes only the unionization
variable, without the benefit of controls. The results are shown in Table 6.
Not surprisingly, given the outcomes reported above, we find a statistically
significant relationship between unionization and ADR coverage when no
controls are included: unionized firms are 71% more likely to have higher
ADR coverage levels than nonunion companies. This outcome is significant
at the .05 level of analysis.
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Table 6: Ordinal Regression: Level of ADR Coverage in the Fortune
1000 and Union StatuS45
*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; *
significant at the .10 level.
Adding controls to our ordinal regression does not diminish the effects of
unionization on ADR coverage. In fact, when accounting for all other factors
within our data that might shape coverage levels, the unionization of the firm
is highly influential; Fortune 1000 companies with a union presence are more
likely by a factor of 2.288 to have higher ADR coverage levels than are
nonunion companies (p<.01). This result, which is based on a more robust
model for determining ADR coverage, is in fact more highly significant than
the result obtained without the use of controls. The higher magnitude of
significance suggests an additional consideration, namely, that the
relationship between unionization and the ADR coverage of the nonunion
workforce may be moderated by other variables included in the model,
specifically the company's location and industry. 46 Although a formal test
analyzing the interactions between these independent variables is beyond the
scope of this paper, the overall determination is that there is a substantial and
positive relationship between unionization and ADR coverage, and this
relationship is confirmed by robust empirical analysis.
E. Strategic Logic for Using ADR and Union Status
To comprehend more fully the extent to which unionization might
influence workplace dispute resolution in the Fortune 1000, we examined a
company's strategic logic for electing to use ADR instead of litigation.
Survey respondents were asked a number of questions regarding why they
45 Note that our ordinal data are unable to pass the test of parallel lines. However,
the results are intended to be confirmatory of our descriptive findings, and we maintain
that the benefit of employing robust analytical techniques to confirm the relationship
between unionization and ADR coverage outweighs this limitation.
46 This is suggested by the finding that, in an incremental ordinal regression (not
shown in this paper but available on request), the unionization coefficient changes when
industry and location are added to the model.
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Variable Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds
I (Std. Error) Ratio (Sid. Error) Ratio
Union .537** 1.710 .828*** 2.288
Firm (.244) (.312)
Controls No Yes
Included?
[Vol. 28:1 2013]
UNIONS AND ADR
typically used ADR as an alternative to the courts. We grouped many of
these responses into two categories, which we labeled "efficiency benefits"
and "legal benefits." Efficiency benefits relate to the saving of time and
money vis-A-vis litigation. Legal benefits include the preservation of
confidentiality and the avoidance of precedent. Many survey respondents
also stressed another benefit of using ADR. They told us they preferred to
use ADR rather than litigation because ADR helped to maintain and preserve
management's relationships with other parties. Each of these benefits, we
maintain, provides a company with a strategic reason to use ADR rather than
resort to litigation. We further postulate that the extent to which a firm is
unionized can potentially shape its strategy in using ADR.
To test the influence of the union status of a firm on its strategic choice
to use ADR, we ran a series of three logistic regressions. Given the analytical
value of using statistical controls, we included other factors that we think
might influence the firm's strategic choice for using ADR, including
employee productivity, size of the firm, industry, and location. In our first
model (shown in Table 7), we find no significant relationship between
unionization and efficiency benefits. That is, a majority of corporations use
ADR to save time and money, and there is no significant difference between
union and nonunion companies in this regard. Similarly, in our second model
in Table 7, we again find that union status has no significant influence on
legal benefits; again, a majority of firms value ADR because they believe its
use provides certain legal benefits (for example, the avoidance of precedent)
and there is no significant difference between union and nonunion companies
in this regard.
Table 7: Logistic Regression: Strategic Logic for Using ADR and Union
Status
Variable EFFICIENCY LEGAL BENEFITS RELATIONSHIP
BENEFITS BENEFITS
Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds Coefficient Odds
(Std Error) Ratio (Std. Error) Ratio (Std. Error) Ratio
Union -.150 (.314) .861 -.166 (.331) .847 .558* 1.748
Firm (.300)
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Included?
*** = significant at the .01 level; ** = significant at the .05 level; * =
significant at the .10 level.
In our third model, however, we find that union status has a highly
significant influence on a firm's use of ADR because the firm believes ADR
preserves relationships. This significance is found both with and without
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controls. It appears that the managers of union companies are significantly
more likely than the managers of nonunion companies to use ADR because
they believe the use of ADR to resolve disputes with nonunion employees
helps to preserve relationships with those employees (p<.10). We view this
finding as a key difference between the ADR strategies used by union and
nonunion companies. At union companies managers were 74.8% more likely
to use ADR to ensure the preservation of the firm's relationships with its
nonunion employees than were managers at nonunion companies.
In sum, our statistical findings demonstrate that: (1) the union status of a
company affects its choice of the ADR practices it uses with nonunion
employees; (2) the union status of a company is also significantly and
positively related to the extent to which its nonunion employees are covered
by ADR practices and policies; and (3) the union status of a company
appears to be partially related to the strategic benefits the company associates
with the use of ADR. More specifically, both union and nonunion companies
use ADR because they believe it results in efficiency and legal benefits, but
union companies, to a much greater extent than nonunion companies, use
ADR because they believe it preserves relationships with their nonunion
employees. Thus, on the whole, there is no difference between union and
nonunion companies in the strategic logic that underlies their use of ADR
policies and practices-with the important exception that union companies
attach greater value to the use of ADR to preserve relationships than do
nonunion companies. In the next section of our paper we, examine the
practical and policy implications of these findings and suggest their meaning
for future research on ADR.
V. INSIDE OUR FINDINGS: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE STUDY OF ADR
A. Overview
The findings reported above provide a unique perspective on the role that
unions play as one of the factors that shape ADR adoption patterns in U.S.
corporations. Our findings offer evidence regarding three important
dimensions of the use of ADR by U.S. corporations. First, our evidence casts
light on the effects of unionization on the availability of different ADR
practices. Although we do not find that union status affects the portfolio of
ADR practices offered by the corporations in our sample, we do find that
union firms are somewhat more likely than nonunion firms to provide
arbitration for their nonunion employees. Also, we find that nonunion firms
are more likely to offer med-arb to their employees than union firms. This
evidence, therefore, links unions to the type of ADR practices present in a
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given firm. Second, our examination reveals that unionization has a positive
effect on the access employees have to ADR practices. These findings get at
a very different aspect of the use of ADR. Whereas our findings on the
availability of ADR practices deal with the effect of the union status of the
firm on the quantity and type of those practices, our findings on ADR
coverage or access deal with the effect of union status on the quality of ADR
practices and policies. More specifically, these findings highlight the extent
to which ADR practices are deeply embedded in the organizations adopting
them. Third, our findings also capture the relationship between unionization
and a firm's strategic posture toward ADR. Do unions affect the rationale at
the heart of an organization's adoption of ADR? Do union firms differ from
nonunion firms in the benefits they seek from the adoption of ADR practices
and policies? We find partial confirmation of the proposition that union firms
differ from nonunion firms in their view of the strategic benefits they derive
from the use of ADR.
We maintain that a complete understanding of the organizational
adoption of ADR requires an assessment of all three dimensions examined
above. Researchers seeking to advance the study of ADR, we believe, should
seek evidence on the factors that influence the availability of ADR practices,
access to them, and the strategic intentions guiding firms that adopt them.
Taken together, our examination of each of the three dimensions of the
use of ADR allows us to paint a more detailed portrait of the nature of the
influence union status has on the use of ADR by large U.S. corporations. As
we noted in our introduction, researchers have advanced two competing
hypotheses about the nature of this relationship. Some have argued that
employers view ADR as a substitute for unions and collective bargaining.
Unionization affects corporate decisions to use ADR by providing an
incentive for firms either to remain nonunion or to keep existing levels of
unionization in their organization at bay. According to this hypothesis, a
firm's decision about which ADR practices to adopt and how much coverage
to provide its employees are, for the most part, dictated by the firm's attempt
to avoid unions.
An alternative perspective, however, needs to be considered. It is
possible-even likely-that the presence of unions in an organization
provides a firm with an intimate understanding and awareness of the benefits
and costs associated with the use of various dispute resolution techniques that
are typically associated with collective bargaining. The knowledge and
experience an employer gains from the use of mediation, arbitration, fact-
finding, and other dispute resolution techniques associated with collective
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bargaining motivates employers to adopt the use of those techniques to
resolve disputes with their nonunion employees.47
Our findings provide important empirical evidence about these two
competing hypotheses. Our analyses strongly suggest that the
complementarities hypothesis is a better explanation of the effect of union
status on the use of ADR practices and policies than the substitution or
avoidance hypothesis. Firms with unions seem to have a better understanding
of what the use of ADR entails, including both its advantages and
disadvantages; they provide broader ADR coverage to their nonunion
employees, and their strategic motivation for adopting ADR is centered on
the perception that the use of ADR helps preserve relationships.
Next, we discuss each of our key empirical findings, highlighting their
contribution to our understanding of the factors motivating employers to use
ADR and the questions they raise about the dimensions of ADR we do not
yet understand. We will piece together the evidence provided in each of the
separate statistical analyses we have performed in an effort to construct a
nuanced and comprehensive portrait of the influence of unions on the
adoption of ADR practices and policies. In each of the following sections, we
will consider the extent to which the empirical evidence strengthens or
weakens the existing hypotheses about the relationship between unions and
ADR.
B. The Effects of Unions on the Availability ofADR Options
One of the prevalent working hypotheses about the relationship between
unionization and ADR practices is based on the "threat effect" of unions.48
47 Research on civil litigation and arbitration suggests that a party's experience in a
proceeding is valuable. An important stream of research in the dispute resolution field
deals with the so-called "repeat player effect." The repeat player effect holds that in any
legal system a player that has experience has an edge over a player that does not have
experience. Galanter is credited with being the first scholar to stress that repeat players
have advantages over one-shot players in legal proceedings. Marc Galanter, Why the
Haves Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change 9 LAW & SOC'Y
REv. 95 (1974). Empirical research on employment arbitration has found that repeat
players (usually employers) obtain better outcomes than one-shot players (usually
employees). Lisa B. Bingham is generally recognized for her path-breaking work on this
topic. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of
Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Awards, 29 McGEORGE L. REV.
223 (1998). More recently Colvin has confirmed Bingham's findings in a study of
employment arbitration awards in cases administered by the American Arbitration
Association. Alexander J.S. Colvin, An Empirical Study ofEmployment Arbitration: Case
Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. OF EMP. LEGAL STUDIES 1 (2011).
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Nonunion firms, according to this argument, are more likely to adopt ADR
practices in an effort to ward off the "dangers""associated with being
unionized. Support for this hypothesis would require empirical evidence that
a firm's union status affects the availability of ADR practices. Do nonunion
firms, threatened by the prospect of being unionized, offer a broader portfolio
of ADR practices in an effort to avoid unions? The "threat effect" hypothesis
would also be supported by evidence of a relationship between union status
and specific ADR practices, such as arbitration. Are nonunion firms more
likely to adopt specific types of ADR practices? Colvin, for example, found
that nonunion firms facing the "threat" of unionization were more likely to
adopt peer review panels while firms facing litigation threats were more
likely to adopt arbitration.49
Our findings provide a new lens through which to understand the effects
of the adoption of ADR by U.S. corporations. First, despite the prevalent
proposition that union status affects the overall availability of ADR practices
in firms, our regression analyses found no statistically significant relationship
between a firm's union status and its portfolio of ADR practices. Nonunion
firms, according to our findings, are no more likely to have a broad range of
ADR practices than union firms. As social scientists, our instincts are to
search for significant statistical relationships, but our first set of regression
analyses does not find a statistically significant relationship between the
union status of the firm and the range of ADR practices the firm uses.
Nevertheless, we believe that this nonsignificant finding is extremely
interesting because it sheds important light on the validity of the union
avoidance hypothesis. Conventional wisdom holds that the threat effect of
unionization motivates nonunion (or partially unionized) companies to adopt
an array of ADR practices-indeed, a broader array of practices than would
typically be the case in a union firm.
As we noted in our discussion of integrated conflict management
systems, such systems are characterized by multiple access points and
multiple options. In a union firm, an employee filing a grievance almost
always has only one access point, namely, he or she is required to file a
grievance with his or her immediate supervisor. By contrast, in an integrated
conflict management system, an employee can file a complaint with his or
her immediate supervisor or with the human resource office, the counsel's
office, the office that manages the conflict management system, or other
offices within the corporation. Similarly, in a union firm a grievance that is
not resolved in earlier steps of the grievance procedure needs to be submitted
48 Batt et al., supra note 24; Colvin, supra note 24.
49 Colvin, supra note 24, at 389.
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to arbitration for a final decision. By contrast, in an integrated conflict
management system, an employee with a complaint may have a choice of
options for resolving that complaint (mediation, fact-finding, arbitration,
etc.). 50 Thus, when Raytheon established its integrated conflict management
system for its nonunion employees, it offered a wider array of ADR choices
for its nonunion employees than it did for its union employees. Accordingly,
we thought it made sense to hypothesize that union firms would offer a larger
portfolio of ADR practices to their nonunion employees. However, our
regression analyses did not support this hypothesis.
This finding is also at odds with hypotheses about both the external and
internal effects of unions on ADR. From the perspective of the external
pressures that unions wield on employers, nonunion firms do not appear to be
more motivated than union firms to adopt a broad range of ADR practices.
The threat of unions in nonunion firms does not seem to be sending them in
search of a broader ADR portfolio.
Similarly, in partially unionized firms, the internal consequences
associated with unions do not appear to affect the diffusion of ADR practices
to the nonunion segments of the organization. One of the core functions of
unions, as we have noted, is to provide institutional mechanisms through
which workplace conflict can be addressed. Furthermore, in addition to
altering the ways in which firms resolve conflict, unionization has a
substantial effect on a firm's internal structures and practices. 51 Thus, one
might have expected to find clear differences in the scope of ADR options
afforded to employees in union and nonunion firms. Nevertheless, our
evidence suggests that partially unionized firms are not influenced by the
constraints placed on them by their unions or by the flexibility afforded to
nonunion establishments in their adoption of ADR practices.
Taken together, our empirical analyses of the availability of ADR
practices do not support either the external threat (union avoidance) or
internal structure (union complementarities) hypotheses. This is not to say
that union status does not matter when it comes to ADR adoption, but it does
not appear to matter in one of the key ways some researchers and
practitioners had assumed it would.52 It is important to note that our analysis
50 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1.
51 SLICHTER ET AL., supra note 30.
52 Theodore J. St. Antoine, Symposium on Labor Arbitration Thirty Years after the
Steelworkers Trilogy: Afterward, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 845, 854 (1990) ("The propriety
of participating in nonunion arbitrations has become a bone of contention within the
National Academy of Arbitrators. . . . [T]here is worry that such procedures are simply
union-avoidance devices and that the deck is heavily stacked against the grievant, who is
a one-time player against the repeater employer.").
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does not consider the effects of union status in specific settings or contexts. It
is possible, for example, that nonunion firms in certain industries or settings
are more likely to be influenced by either the external or internal pressures
highlighted in the literature. Future research should put our non-finding to
the test and examine the extent to which the availability of ADR practices
may be affected by union status in particular contexts.
We also tested the relationship between a firm's union status and the
likelihood of the firm adopting individual ADR practices, such as arbitration,
med-arb, grievance systems, and fact-finding. Dispute resolution scholars
often distinguish between interest-based and rights-based methods of dealing
with conflict. 53 Rights-based methods include litigation and arbitration. The
distinguishing characteristic of a rights-based method of resolving a dispute
is that the method results in a decision (or award) by an impartial third party
decision maker. Often the main task of the neutral in a rights-based ADR
dispute is to declare formally which party was "right" and which party was
"wrong." Interest-based dispute resolution techniques include mediation,
facilitation, and fact-finding: the distinguishing characteristic of an interest-
based method is that the impartial third party in the dispute has no authority
to make a decision or issue an award. In contrast to rights-based techniques,
neutrals using interest-based methods do not declare the legal merits of the
parties' arguments nor do they decide on winners or losers. Rather, neutrals
using interest-based methods seek to address each party's needs and wants in
an attempt to lead the disputants to a voluntary settlement. Thus, the neutral
in a rights-based process (e.g., an arbitrator or a judge) has a great deal more
power and authority than a neutral in an interest-based process (e.g., a
mediator or a facilitator).
53 See WILLIAM L. URY ET AL., GETTING DISPUTES RESOLVED: DESIGNING SYSTEMS
TO CUT THE COST OF CONFLICT (1st ed. 1988). Ury, Brett, and Goldberg are credited with
being the first scholars to distinguish rights-based methods from interest-based methods.
It should be noted that there is a difference between interest disputes and rights disputes,
on the one hand, and interest-based methods and rights-based methods of resolving
disputes, on the other hand. Labor relations scholars have made a distinction between
interest disputes (arising out of the negotiation of new contracts) and rights disputes
(arising out of the application or interpretation of existing contracts) for decades. A
rights-based method (such as arbitration) can be used to resolve an interest dispute (e.g.,
an impasse in the negotiation of a new collective bargaining agreement); an interest-
based method (such as mediation) can be used to resolve a rights dispute (e.g., a
grievance filed by a unionized employee over the interpretation of a clause in an existing
collective bargaining contract). For a discussion of interest disputes and rights disputes
by a neutral who helped to resolve thousands of both types of disputes, see THEODORE W.
KHEEL, THE KEYS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION: PROVEN METHODS OF SETTLING DISPUTES
VOLUNTARILY (1st ed. 1999).
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Arguably, union firms have experienced constraints on their managerial
authority because of collective bargaining. Do union firms seek to gain
flexibility in the way they settle disputes with their nonunion employees by
using interest-based techniques and avoiding rights-based options?
Alternatively, do union firms, which have had considerable experience with
rights-based options such as arbitration, prefer to use rights-based options
with their nonunion workforce? Similarly, are nonunion firms more or less
likely to turn to rights- or interest-based options, given that they have not had
the experiences with these options that union firms have had?
Our findings provide interesting insights to these questions. First, our
evidence shows that union firms are more likely to offer arbitration to their
nonunion employees than firms that are completely nonunion. Thus, a firm's
union status does, in fact, influence its choice of specific ADR practices.
Union firms, which have experience with labor arbitration, appear to pursue a
rights-based option for employment disputes. On its face, this finding
appears to support the internal complementarities hypothesis regarding the
organization's use of ADR. It is possible that union firms seek to create some
level of uniformity in the dispute resolution options they offer to their
nonunion and union employees. If this presumption is correct, then factors
internal to the organization (e.g., the desire for standardized workplace
policies) are driving the higher adoption rates of arbitration in union firms.
This finding, therefore, contributes to our understanding of the manner in
which firms select specific ADR practices. A firm's decision, we suggest, is
at least in part affected by internal considerations shaped, among other
things, by a firm's union status.
We also examined the reasons firms gave for not using certain ADR
practices. On the one hand, our evidence suggests that partially unionized
firms are more likely to use arbitration to resolve disputes with their
nonunion employees than nonunion firms. On the other hand, our evidence
demonstrates that union firms that chose not to use employment arbitration
did so for two principal reasons: these firms did not like the fact that the use
of arbitration often results in compromise outcomes, and they also did not
like the fact that arbitrators' decisions are difficult to appeal. Is there a
contradiction in these two findings? We submit that the two findings can be
reconciled. Union firms probably know much better than nonunion firms all
of the advantages and disadvantages associated with using arbitration to
resolve employee disputes. When a union firm chooses to use arbitration
with its nonunion employees, it understands that arbitration is quicker and
cheaper than litigation and results in final and binding decisions. But when a
union firm decides not to use arbitration with its nonunion employees, it
weighs the disadvantages more heavily than the advantages; rather than
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appreciating the final and binding nature of arbitration, the firm dislikes the
difficulty of appealing arbitrators' decisions, and by the same token, rather
than valuing the quicker and cheaper decisions in arbitration, the firm
dislikes the fact that they are more likely to be compromise decisions.
Second, our findings also document that union status has a significant
effect on the use of med-arb. More specifically, nonunion firms are more
likely to adopt this hybrid ADR technique than their unionized counterparts.
Med-arb represents a combination of the rights-based elements of arbitration
with the interest-based elements of mediation. In resolving disputes using
this technique, parties first attempt to reach a settlement using mediation. If
mediation proves unsuccessful, the technique then calls for the use of
arbitration. Thus, the parties first have the opportunity to focus on their
interests and needs in a mediation forum, while keeping the option of
addressing their dispute in a rights-based forum. This technique provides the
parties with greater flexibility than most other ADR practices. Our finding
that nonunion firms are more likely to use med-arb suggests that these firms
place a higher emphasis on maintaining flexibility in dealing with workplace
conflict. Although med-arb can lead to a more formal and binding arbitration
process, nonunion firms may be more likely than unionized firms to use the
technique because it insures the initial use of an interest-based option.
It is important to note that our data do not allow us to empirically
examine the underlying rationale for a firm's ADR preferences. Our findings,
however, provide important evidence that union and nonunion firms have
different preferences regarding the use of ADR practices. Future research
should build on these findings and seek to uncover the factors that explain
the differences between the preferences of union and nonunion firms for
arbitration and med-arb.
C. The Effects of Unions on Access to ADR Coverage
Our discussion above relates to the relationship between union status and
the firm's decision about the availability of ADR practices. Firm decisions
about ADR adoption, however, go beyond the question of which practices
will be made available to their workforce. Firms also make decisions about
the extent to which employees will have access to these practices. We
maintain that in assessing the effects of union status on ADR adoption
patterns, the question of access is central to understanding this relationship.
Workforce ADR coverage goes to the heart of the commitment an
organization has to the basic principles and assumptions that are central to
this organizational approach. Is a firm's use of ADR primarily symbolic in
nature? Or does the firm's use of ADR reflect a more substantive and deeply
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rooted commitment to using ADR to manage and resolve workplace
conflicts? We maintain that the extent to which employees have access to
ADR practices is an indicator of the extent to which an organization is
committed to using ADR to manage and resolve workplace conflict.
Our empirical findings show that union status does, in fact, have a
statistically significant effect on ADR coverage. Specifically, union firms
were more likely than nonunion firms to provide their employees with access
to the ADR practices they had in place. Nonunion employees in unionized
firms are more likely to be covered by ADR practices than their counterparts
in firms with no unions. If our assumption that ADR coverage is a good
proxy for commitment, then our findings suggest that union firms are more
committed to ADR policies than nonunion firms. We believe that this finding
is of particular importance for the study of ADR patterns in general. First,
this is the only study of which we are aware that considers the organization's
commitment (at least by proxy) to ADR policies. Our findings emphasize the
need for ADR scholarship to move beyond the analysis of adoption and to
the study of variation in commitment levels. Understanding the pace at which
ADR takes root within American firms requires, we maintain, an enhanced
understanding of the organizational factors that lead to broader ADR
coverage of a firm's employees.
We interpret our findings to support the argument that union and
nonunion firms differ on their commitment to ADR, but they do not provide
empirical evidence on the motivation underlying this commitment. There are
a number of plausible explanations for the finding that partially unionized
firms provide broader ADR coverage than nonunion firms. First, building on
the discussion above regarding the threat effect of unions, it is possible that
union firms are eager to prevent the unionization of their nonunion facilities.
To prevent the spread of unionization, these firms may seek to provide ADR
coverage to as many of their nonunion employees as possible. Thus, a firm's
commitment to ADR, according to this argument, is not motivated by its
endorsement of the principles at the heart of these practices. Rather, the
firm's commitment is a means of avoiding the spread of unions. Although
plausible, we are somewhat skeptical of the validity of this explanation. If
commitment to ADR serves as a means of avoiding unions, we would expect
to find a similar strategy in nonunion firms that are seeking to avoid
unionization altogether. Our evidence, however, does not support such an
interpretation. We did not find a significant relationship between union status
and a firm's ADR portfolio. If firms were using ADR as a means of avoiding
unions, we would also expect to find a significant relationship between union
status and the breadth of ADR practices provided to employees.
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We argued earlier that a partially unionized firm may seek consistency in
its practices and policies with both its nonunion and union workforce.
Collective bargaining contracts almost always provide employees covered by
those contracts with access to a formal grievance procedure. These firms may
be motivated to provide broader ADR coverage not to avoid the unionization
of their nonunion employees, but rather by a desire to achieve consistency in
dispute resolution policies across their organizations. Again, the firm's
motivation is not necessarily a function of its belief that ADR is a superior
method of dealing with workplace conflict, but rather by its commitment to
organizational parity. Our finding that union firms are more likely to use
arbitration to resolve disputes with their nonunion employees strengthens this
argument.
We cannot say with certainty that the relationship between union
coverage and ADR coverage supports or refutes either the union avoidance
hypothesis or the union complementarities hypothesis. On balance, we
believe our findings are more consistent with the latter hypothesis than the
former, but without additional evidence on employer motives we cannot
reach a dispositive conclusion. Our empirical findings on ADR coverage
highlight the need for additional research on the relationship between
organizational motivations and commitment to internal workplace dispute
resolution.
D. The Effects of Union Status on the Strategic Posture toward ADR
Recently, conflict management scholars have begun to examine the
strategic underpinnings associated with the organizational use of various
dispute resolution practices. Lipsky and Avgar, for example, developed a
theory of workplace conflict management that recognizes that organizations
vary in the strategic goals they seek to achieve by using ADR policies and
practices. For example, some organizations may use ADR to achieve a very
basic objective, namely, the resolution of disputes that might otherwise be
settled by litigation. Other organizations may use ADR as a means of
achieving broader managerial and organizational goals, such as enhancing
employee voice or improving the alignment between different management
functions (such as the human resource function and the counsel's office). 54
Lipsky and Avgar also argue that an organization's use of ADR to
achieve its strategic objectives is a function of certain characteristics of the
organization. Union status is certainly one of those characteristics, but there
are others that are likely to influence the organization's ADR strategies. For
54 Lipsky & Avgar, supra note 3, at 172-79. See also, Avgar, supra note 2.
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example, organizations that have adopted team-based work are more likely to
pursue broader ADR goals than merely the resolution of disputes. As we
have noted, evidence from case studies suggests that corporations that have
high-performance work systems also tend to use integrated conflict
management systems. 55
We found only partial support for the proposition that the union status of
a corporation affects the strategic benefits the organization hopes to achieve
by using ADR. There was no significant difference between union and
nonunion firms in the importance they attached to achieving legal and
efficiency benefits through the use of ADR. Both union and nonunion firms
attached equivalent value to the use of ADR to achieve legal and efficiency
benefits. But union and nonunion firms in our sample differed on the weight
they attached to the use of ADR policies and practices to preserve
relationships with their employees: union firms attached much more weight
to the importance of using ADR to preserve relationships. It appears that the
managers of union firms have learned through their experience in collective
bargaining that it is important to use dispute resolution methods to preserve
and enhance relations with their employees. We do not know enough about
the nature of labor-management relations in the corporations in our sample to
fully understand the link between a firm's experience with its unions and its
desire to use ADR to preserve relationships with its employees. On the one
hand, it is possible that a corporation that has had an adversarial relationship
with its union (or unions) views ADR as a means of avoiding an adversarial
relationship with its nonunion employees. On the other hand, it is also
possible that a corporation that has had a collaborative relationship with its
union (or unions) has learned that the use of negotiation, mediation,
arbitration, and other dispute resolution techniques can help produce a
positive relationship with its union employees and wants to replicate that
experience with its nonunion employees. In either case, once again the
corporation's experience in collective bargaining (whether positive or
negative) has informed its view of the appropriate ADR strategy to use with
its nonunion employees. If this argument has validity, then in our view it
cannot be maintained that partially unionized firms use ADR as a union
avoidance strategy. Rather, corporations that have both union and nonunion
facilities seem to learn important lessons from their experiences with their
unionized facilities and then apply those lessons in using ADR in their
nonunion facilities. In brief, this explanation of corporate behavior supports
the complementarities hypothesis, rather than the avoidance hypothesis.
55 LIPSKY ET AL., supra note 1, at 65-69.
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When we consider the totality of evidence we have gathered-on the
availability of ADR practices, the access employees have to those practices,
and the ADR strategies pursued by the corporations in our sample-a portrait
of the difference between a corporation with some union presence and a
corporation without a union presence emerges. Corporations with a union
presence use their experience in labor-management relations to shape the
ADR policies and practices they use with their nonunion employees.
Collective bargaining is a learning experience for these corporations; they
apparently learn "best practices" in the use of dispute resolution techniques
and they apply those lessons to developing ADR policies for their nonunion
employees. By contrast, corporations without a union presence use ADR on a
more limited basis, i.e., ADP, coverage is lower in these firms than it is in
union firms. It needs to be noted that for most of the nonunion corporations
in our sample (especially those in finance, insurance, and most of wholesale
and retail trade) the threat of unionization is absent or barely discernible.
Although Wal-Mart may use the Open Door Policy and other ADR
techniques to avoid unions, the growing use of ADR by major banks, Wall
Street investment firms, and large insurance companies cannot be attributed
to these corporations' fear of unionization.
Future empirical research should be focused on the relationship between
other organizational characteristics and the use of ADR. For example, our
interviews with corporate attorneys and managers suggest that corporations
that are committed to policies that promote workforce diversity are more
likely to use workplace conflict management systems. Also, corporations that
have high ratings on indices of corporate social responsibility appear to have
a stronger commitment to the use of ADR. To date, however, there have not
been rigorous empirical analyses of these propositions. If we seek a fuller
understanding of the development and implementation of ADR policies and
systems, we need to conduct additional empirical research on the
organizational characteristics and strategies that shape those policies.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
What are the implications of our findings for the study of unions and
ADR? First and foremost, we believe this paper is the first to present hard
evidence on the effects of unions on the adoption and use of ADR for
nonunion employees. Although we cannot dismiss entirely union avoidance
as a motive for the corporate use of ADR, we believe our findings regarding
ADR availability, access, and strategy support the complementarities
hypothesis. Our interpretation of the findings presented here suggest that
most major corporations do not adopt ADR practices and policies to avoid
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unions, in part because for many major corporations there is no realistic
threat of unionization. In addition, however, major corporations that do have
some level of union presence learn about the advantages and disadvantages
associated with various dispute resolution techniques and seek to deliver the
benefits of those techniques to their nonunion employees. We also believe
that many corporations prefer to align the policies they use with their union
employees with the policies they use for their nonunion employees, and this
preference motivates them to extend the use of mediation, arbitration, and
other ADR techniques to their nonunion employees.
Second, it is somewhat ironic that our findings highlight the important
role that unions play in delivering access to voice and dispute resolution
practices to nonunion employees. For many decades, both industrial relations
practitioners and scholars have understood that the influence of unions on
wages and other working conditions extends beyond their members and those
covered by collective bargaining agreements to nonunion employees; this
influence is often referred to as the "spillover effect" of unions. 56 Our
findings provide a concrete example of the influence that unions continue to
have on the working conditions of employees who are not covered by
collective bargaining agreements. In an era when the strength of labor is
clearly declining, these findings serve as a reminder that this decline has
implications for the broader workplace ecology in which unions operate. If
the presence of unions is associated with broader access to ADR for
nonunion employees, it is likely that the continued decline of U.S. unions
will have an adverse effect on the diffusion and use of ADR in nonunion
settings.
Third, our findings also appear to address a longstanding puzzle in the
industrial relations literature. Specifically, given the concrete benefits that
unionized firms obtain from the grievance process, labor relations scholars
have wondered why more nonunion firms do not adopt similar practices for
56 There is a large literature on union spillover effects. A classic work is H.G.
LEWIS, UNIONISM AND RELATIVE WAGES IN THE UNITED STATES: AN EMPIRICAL INQUIRY
(1st ed. 1963). See also, David Blanchflower, Union Relative Wage Effects: A Cross-
Section Analysis Using Establishment Data, 22 BRIT. J. INDUS. RELATIONS 311 (1984);
FREEMAN ET AL., supra note 32, at 150-61 (1984); Lawrence M. Kahn, Union Spillover
Effects on Organized Labor Markets, 15 J. HUMAN RES. 87 (1980) ("The union impact on
nonunion workers' real wage is made up of opposing forces and is therefore a priori
ambiguous. One the one hand, unions may indirectly cause the crowding of workers into
nonunion jobs, lowing wages there. On the other hand union threat effects may cause
nonunion employers to raise wages. Further, these influences may vary according to
demographic group. Thus, knowledge of the net effect of unions on nonunion real wages
of different groups has direct implications for the union impact on income distribution
among workers and for segmentation in the labor market.").
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their employees. In their seminal book What Do Unions Do?, Freeman and
Medoff discuss the effects that union grievance systems have on reducing
employee turnover and state, "If grievance-and-arbitration and industrial
jurisprudence rules reduce turnover, and if such reductions save companies
money, the question naturally arises as to why nonunion firms don't mimic
union firms and offer workers the benefits of voice as part of a profit-
maximizing strategy." 57 Freeman and Medoff maintain that nonunion firms
are more attune to young, mobile workers than union firms, and younger
workers have less desire for voice mechanisms such as grievance procedures.
They also assert that nonunion managers are reluctant to give up power and
allow their decisions to be challenged in a grievance procedure that ends in
arbitration. 58
Much has changed since Freeman and Medoff addressed this question,
and a growing number of nonunion firms have, in fact, adopted ADR
practices. Nevertheless, Freeman and Medoffs puzzle is still relevant-what
prevents a sizeable proportion of nonunion firms from seeking to benefit
from practices that have yielded clear returns to unionized firms for many
decades? Our findings may contribute some insight about this persistent
question. First, we argue that experience counts: companies with a union
presence develop an understanding of the pros and cons of dispute resolution
techniques and are, therefore, able to make informed decisions about what
elements of ADR they want to provide to their nonunion employees. By
contrast, a company without a union presence, and therefore limited
experience with dispute resolution techniques, may be required to take a
proverbial "leap of faith" in adopting the use of ADR. Nonunion employers
may not understand what Freeman and Medoff understand, namely, that
grievance procedures, arbitration, and other voice mechanisms provide
tangible benefits for employers. Second, Freeman and Medoff use profit
maximization to frame their paradox, arguing that union-type voice
mechanisms yield bottom-line results for employers. But establishing and
managing these voice mechanisms is not costless for the firm. In nonunion
firms, the costs associated with designing and implementing ADR practices
and systems may be knowable, but the benefits are at best uncertain.
Corporations that use ADR practices and systems believe that they save time
and money by doing so. Lipsky and his colleagues conducted field interviews
with executives and managers in over forty corporations, seeking information
about the reasons these corporations had or had not adopted ADR practices.
They observed, "There is in fact very little hard evidence that corporations
57 Freeman & Medoff, supra note 32, at 107.
58 Id. at 107-108.
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actually do save time and money by using ADR, however. Furthermore, it is
not clear to us that many corporations are even gathering the information
necessary to make a cost-benefit analysis. We pressed our respondents to tell
us what they were doing in this regard, and most gave us vague responses or
admitted they were not doing much." 59
Finally, we hope our paper will inform the broader study of ADR,
beyond the question of its relationship to unions. Our findings support the
argument that organizational characteristics influence the adoption and use of
ADR practices, but there is much that we do not yet know about other
organizational characteristics that affect these practices. We believe,
especially, that we lack an understanding of the role that management
leadership plays in driving the ADR strategy of a corporation. Our survey
data show that corporations that seem nearly identical (in terms of industry,
number of employees, product mix, union status, and virtually every other
observable characteristic) often pursue dramatically different ADR strategies.
The explanation for this variance in strategies may very well be rooted in
differences in factors such as corporate governance, organizational structure,
and the character and philosophy of corporate officers. We hope that
researchers in the future will gather data on these factors and use it in their
analyses of the antecedents of ADR practices and systems. 60
5 LIPSKY ET. AL., supra note 1, at 313.
60 We have started to incorporate some of these factors in Lipsky et al., supra note
19.
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Figure 1. Experience with Types of ADR among Fortune 1000
Companies, 1997 and 2011
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Figure 2. The Use of Arbitration by Type of Dispute, 1997 and 2011
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